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This work project illustrates the characteristics of Special Purpose Acquisition Companies and 
focuses specifically on the Italian Market. 
SPACs’ performance is analysed using an even study framework and classifying the companies 
either in Good SPACs or Bad SPACs depending on market prices before the vote on the 
acquisitions. Raw and risk adjusted returns are computed and I find evidence for 
underperformance of this asset class, with the Bad SPACs sub-sample performing significantly 
worse than the Good SPACs. 
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1.  Introduction 
Companies go public and list on a stock exchange for several reasons, from raising capital to 
increasing liquidity for their existing shareholders to allowing initial investors to exit and cash 
in on their investment. 
There are several methods of going public, the most common being the traditional IPO with an 
underwriter that supports the company in different phases of the process, from the initial filing, 
to the roadshow, to the book-building and allocation of shares. 
In the past decade, new methods substantially deviating from the traditional IPO have emerged. 
Dutch auctions, Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), direct listings, and online 
bids entered the landscape. 
In this work I will focus on SPACs and their performance in the Italian market. This market 
experienced a surge in listings of SPACs over the past years, with a total of 26 SPACs that 
raised €3.62bn in total. This figure represents 10.5% of the funds raised in IPOs on the Italian 
Stock Exchange, with a total of 250 deals that raised overall €34.4bn. Full statistics are available 
below in Figure 1. 
This work project is structured as follows: section II introduces some important theoretical 
concepts instrumental to understanding the subsequent sections. I analyse SPACs’ structure 
with a focus on the stakeholders involved and their incentives, and I make a comparison with 
Private Equity funds, with which they share features. I give an overview of the most prominent 
literature. In section III, I present the methodology and the data used in my work. In section IV, 
I describe the sample and present the share price behaviour around key dates of the SPAC 
lifecycle: announcement date and voting date. I subsequently analyse the returns of two 
different portfolios – which I call Good and Bad SPACs – up to two years after the acquisition. 
In the last part I discuss the reasons why some acquisitions were carried out even though the 
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market signalled ex-ante that they were value destroying. Section V presents a conclusive 
overview of the asset class as whole and its future.  
Figure 1: IPOs and SPACs listed in Italy (Number of deals right hand axis, total funds raised 
left hand axis) 
 
2. SPACs overview 
SPACs are not a new product. The first SPACs originated in the United States in the 1980s and 
were often associated with obscure and dodgy investments as the asset class was very loosely 
regulated. The bad experience and SEC intervention killed the market for many years, until the 
SEC published new rules known as Rule 419 to better safeguard investors. SPACs were back 
in the spotlight as demonstrated by the surge in number of IPOs and funds raised. In Italy, the 
first SPAC saw the light in 2011 and many more followed. In Figure 2 below, the total number 
of IPOs and SPACs listed in the US, together with the total funds raised by the two categories, 
are reported. Over the period 2010-2020 2764 companies were listed, with a total value of 
€526.9bn; of these 433 were SPACs with a total value of €107.3bn, but with their share trending 
upwards. In 2020 224 SPACs were listed and raised €65.8bn, representing more than half of 
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Figure 2: IPOs and SPACs listed in the US (Number of deals right hand axis, total funds raised 
left hand axis) 
 
The existing literature on SPACs outside the USA is still in its infancy as longer track records 
are needed to announce their success or failure. The features of SPACs are also still subject to 
constant change, and they are still considered a niche. 
In this chapter I outline the main features of this product, I analyse differences and similarities 
with Private Equity funds, and I give an overview of the existing literature. 
2.1 SPACs’ features 
SPACs are also known as blank-cheque companies. They are listed on the stock exchange to 
raise money from investors and their objective is to carry out an acquisition within a certain 
amount of time, usually 24 months. They are sponsored and managed by promoters who take 
care of finding the target to merge with and negotiate the purchase price. Usually, promoters 
already have expertise in the target industry of the SPAC. Promoters are responsible for 
negotiating and proposing to shareholders the price of the target, so unlike other methods the 
process of price discovery is not market driven. They are granted special shares and earn-out 
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feature is very important as it gives the promoters an incentive to complete any acquisition, 
which generates conflicts of interest with other shareholders. 
Individual investors participating in the IPO acquire a unit, for the price of 10 Euro, consisting 
of a share and a warrant that will eventually allow acquiring further shares after the acquisition 
is performed. Most of the money raised is deposited in an escrow account and will be used 
solely to acquire the target. The escrow funds are invested in short-term government bonds or 
certificates of deposits. An investment in SPACs is therefore sometimes seen as very low risk 
with upside potential in case a promising acquisition is found. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) 
provide reasons why risky companies should choose units during the initial public offering, 
committing to further dilution by issuing more stocks on a future date as it is a way to signal to 
the market the confidence of promoters in the deal. 
Individual investors have a say on the acquisition, whether by selling their shares on the market 
at a value close to the escrow or at the general meeting where they can redeem their shares 
should they disagree with the proposed acquisition. 
After the shareholders have approved the business combination with a percentage of 
redemptions usually not above 20%, the target is incorporated into the SPAC via a reverse 
merger and starts trading on the stock exchange with a new ticker. If the time limit is reached 
or the necessary consensus is not established the SPAC is liquidated and funds are returned to 
the shareholders. 
The chart in Figure 3 summarises the typical lifecycle of a SPAC:  
- 6 - 
 
Figure 3: SPAC lifecycle (D. Cumming et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance 47) 
 
2.2 Literature review 
Kold and Tykvová (2016) analyse what type of firms tend to use SPACs to go public in the US 
market and find that mostly small and levered firm with low growth opportunities - which may 
not be suitable for a traditional IPO – and during turbulent market conditions use this method. 
In addition, they explain that existing shareholders might push for this option to cash-in on their 
stake or have an option for a future exit. They track long-term abnormal returns and find 
evidence associated with severe underperformance. 
Lakicevic, Shachmurove and Vulanovic (2014), Cumming, Haß and Schweizer (2014) study 
the changes in the corporate design and the characteristics of SPACs and if these changes affect 
the success of the merger. They find that the most important factors are the founders’ reputation, 
the industry and geographic focus of SPACs, and the timing of acquisitions. 
Dimitrova (2017) analyses SPACs’ performance and their variations, explaining them with the 
incentives in the institutional structure of SPACs that push sponsors to pursue bad acquisitions 
rather than no acquisitions. She finds that overall, they perform poorly, and returns are worse 
when acquisitions are announced close to the deadline, when underwriters have deferred fees 
as compensation and when the market value of targets is close to the approval threshold. She 
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discovers that having sponsors involved in the governance and management of the acquired 
entity improves long-term performance. 
Ignatyeva, Rauch and Wahrenburg (2013) focus their study on the European Market, which 
differs from the US market as it is less developed and has looser regulations. They find that 
SPACs, while being listed and incorporated in Europe, do not necessarily focus on that 
geographic area and thus promoters use this option due to tax considerations and less strict 
listing requirements. They investigate the investors’ structure and find that the founders 
decrease their ownership over time, while institutional investors increase it. Moreover, they 
find that most institutional investors with a stake in the SPAC before the acquisition exit the 
company at a later stage, selling to other institutional investors. This last finding indicates that 
there are different groups of investors interested in participating in different stages of SPACs, 
and this might subsequently affect the trading behaviour of such investors, as they have 
different strategies and goals. The authors investigated the targets’ operating performance 
evolution and found a negative development of many profitability metrics after the merger, 
linked to an increase in size. 
Blomkvist and Vulanovic (2020) analysed the US SPAC market from 2003 and found that the 
SPAC volumes and SPAC IPOs over total IPOs are negatively related to the VIX index as a 
measure of market wide uncertainty and to variance of risk premium. They explain that these 
findings are related to reluctance of investors to buy opaque securities and that SPACs’ sponsors 
address this flaw by increasing their skin in the game. 
2.3 SPACs vs Private Equity 
SPACs can be considered a new asset class, but they are similar in many regards to Private 
Equity (PE) funds, as they scout for private companies to invest in. Some authors (Fink, 2012) 
refer to them as Poor man’s private equity fund. 
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Remuneration for managers is similar: PE funds usually have a 20% carry – present in SPACs 
if an acquisition is completed – and a yearly management fee, the latter absent in SPACs. 
Promoters rely on interest income from the escrow or on dedicated capital they injected in the 
SPAC via private placement to fund the SPAC’s management costs and operating expenses 
before the acquisition. 
PE funds usually last 10 years and investors are subject to several capital calls. SPACs have a 
limited time to complete an acquisition – usually 24 months – and capital is granted upfront, at 
the time of the SPAC’s IPO. 
PE’s limited partners have limited exit opportunities before the end of the fund and might be 
subject to reputational constrains if they wish to divest their stake. SPACs are listed on the 
market – albeit their stocks are not always very liquid – and the investors face very little 
obstacles should they want to sell their stake. 
Reputation is of paramount importance for PE, as the whole model is built on repeat business 
and long-term credibility (economies of scale and scope are present too), while SPACs are one-
shot deals – although there is some recurrence in sponsors - and subsequently many structural 
characteristics, such as the possibility to vet the acquisition, are built in to fill this reputational 
gap. 
All in all, PE and SPACs show similarities but many of these characteristics come from the 
context of private contract built on relationship, where information asymmetries and agency 
costs are present but counterbalancing mechanism are put in place. SPACs, being publicly 
traded and subject to higher market scrutiny, loose this beneficial effect coming from the private 
nature of the deal and the reputational checks in place. They grant investor other powers, such 
as the possibility to vote on proposed acquisitions and low-cost exit rights, opening the door for 
investors’ and promoters’ opportunism, as Rodrigues and Stegemollers write. These authors 
analyse the evolution of the SPAC institutional framework and the balance between exit voice 
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and reputation; they point out how “the move toward complete elimination of the vote 
contributes to the literature on voice and exit, suggesting that given a cheap enough exit, 
investors no longer demand any vote as a tool for constraining agency costs”. 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1    Hypothesis development 
Jenkinson and Sousa analysed the SPAC market in the US from 2003 to 2010 as this asset class 
raised more than USD 20bn during those years. 
SPACs, according to the authors, are a very low risk option to invest in future acquisitions. 
They find that more than 50% of the deals destroy value and this fact is signalled by the market 
at the announcement of the potential target and reflected in stock prices. Notwithstanding this 
finding, deals get approved and SPACs are increasing in popularity and the amount of funds 
raised. 
They point out that the SPAC structure creates very strong incentives for the founders to carry 
out any deal, as their payoff is largely linked to completing any acquisition. Nevertheless, 
investors still flood this asset class with money, as it provides very low risk, liquid investments 
and the optionality linked to participating in any future acquisition. 
They proceed by describing the different phases of a SPAC focusing on the evolution of market 
prices. 
They identify two stages: 
• From the SPAC IPO to the announcement of a potential target: most of the capital raised 
from investors is kept segregated in an escrow account and invested in certificates of 
deposit or government bonds. Market prices reflect the value of investments in the 
escrow and show very little volatility. 
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• From the moment when a potential target is announced to the shareholder vote: market 
values gradually move – capturing new information released - to indicate whether the 
deal proposed is value-creating (i.e. share price above escrow liquidation value) or 
value-destroying (i.e. share price below escrow value) according to shareholders’ 
assessment of the deal. 
According to the authors, investors should trust market prices and vote following the criteria 
outlined above. This did not happen, and value-destroying acquisitions were approved. In the 
paper they build a trading strategy following this simple rule, dividing the Bad SPACs from the 
Good SPACs, based on the prices observed pre-vote. Their paper is built on the assumption that 
markets are efficient, and prices incorporate all available information. 
Furthermore, they analyse the reason behind investors’ voting in favour of value-destroying 
acquisitions, studying trading volumes around the decision date, finding that Bad SPACs 
experience a sizeable increase in trades on the days preceding the acquisition, as an indication 
that founders – or other parties acting on their behalf – purchase stocks on the market in an 
attempt to vote in favour of the deal at the upcoming general assembly.  
I base my work project on their idea and apply their methodology to the Italian market, which 
has experienced a surge in listings for this instrument in past years. Studies with this geographic 
focus are missing in today’s literature. 
My work mirrors part of their paper and collects information on all SPACs listed on the Italian 
stock exchange. Likewise, I classify the ones who completed an acquisition in Good or Bad 
SPACs, depending on their share price one day before the shareholders’ approval. 
I analyse the performance of the two sub-portfolios after 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 3 months, 
6 months, 1 year and 2 years, both using raw returns and risk-adjusted metrics. In addition, I 
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show and explain how prices move around different key dates and discuss why Bad acquisitions 
were carried out, by interpreting trading volumes. 
3.2 Data collection 
SPACs information and market prices were collected via Bloomberg Terminal and using 
financial press and management information. 
SPACs included in my study were identified on Bloomberg Terminal using the IPO function 
filtering for: i) SPAC ii) Geographical breakdown: Western Europe, Italy iii) Offer stage: 
trading. The sample period considered ranges from 1 January 2010 to 30 October 2020. 
Often when SPACs merge with the target company they start trading under a new ticker. I 
correct for this issue adjusting the historical series for the SPACs affected. 
All SPACs except one – Archimede Spa – acquired a private company; for the latter I adjust 
market prices considering the shares’ exchange ratio agreed in the deal. 
The key dates of the announcement day of the target and the voting date of the proposed 
business combination were hand collected using either SPAC’s or target’s press release or other 
financial press if original sources were not available. 
3.3   Methodology 
Each SPAC that completed a business combination is classified either as Good or Bad SPAC, 
depending on the observed stock’s price one trading day before the voting day. I assume that 
the liquidation value of each SPAC equals the listing price, as most of the proceeds from the 
IPO are kept in an escrow account and will be fully available to shareholders in case of 
liquidation. If the stocks’ price one day before the voting day is higher that the liquidation value, 
the SPAC is classified as Good SPAC, otherwise as Bad SPAC. Using the actual day of vote as 
reference for the classification does not change the result, except for one entity – FILA Spa. I 
use the classification obtained using the day before the voting date to account for potential 
issues related to the timing of the vote.  
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I calculate raw returns unadjusted for market movements starting from the decision date for 





  (1)  
 
Risk-adjusted returns are calculated using a standard CAPM model as follows: 
 
𝐸(𝑅) = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐸𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)    (2)  
The time frame from the voting date to October 2020 is considered. Using the periods before 
the voting date would not be meaningful as the stock price tracks the liquidation value of the 
escrow account – invested in low-risk instruments – and not the performance of the future 
target. Weekly returns are used and Italian 1-year government bonds are chosen as the risk-free 
asset. FTSE Italia Small Cap is selected as a benchmark given that the index components best 
match the characteristics of the SPACs sample in this study. A broader index – S&P 500 – is 
used as well for comparison. 
I apply an event studies framework to the sample, using the industry Beta from Damodaran as 
input. I evaluate the returns assuming a Beta equal to 1 as well - as often used in event studies 
to adjust for market returns. Another reason to calculate excess returns using a Beta equal to 1 
is that Lewellen (2009) found that some portfolios of SPACs’ capital structure resemble the 
characteristics of LBO funds and have a Beta close to one. They are more leveraged than peers, 
but they invest in industries with lower exposure to systematic sectors. 
Estimating SPACs Beta with CAPM regressions is not a feasible option as the estimation period 
is very short and stocks are not very liquid and thus the results obtained are not meaningful or 
statistically significant. 
The formula used in the event study to calculate cumulative abnormal returns is the following 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅𝑎𝑤𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚 =
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 − 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1
− [𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓)]        (3) 
- 13 - 
 
I summarize the previous result, calculating the statistical significance of the return of the three 
methods being different than zero and the difference between the two sub-samples as well. 
4. Sample data and results 
4.1   Sample description 
The first Italian SPAC was born on June 2011. Since then a total of 25 SPACs were listed on 
the Italian Stock Exchange. Of this sample, 7 were liquidated because they were not able to find 
a suitable target within the established timeframe or the proposed acquisition was voted down 
by investors. The remaining 18 successfully completed a business combination.  
In terms of industry focus, some SPACs have in their bylaws a specific sector of interest, which 
is often reflected in the expertise of the promoters, while others are generalist. Due to the small 
universe of Italian SPACs, it is difficult to draw conclusions on the favourite industry of interest 
of the promoters, as target companies have been operating in very different sectors, including 
machinery, insurance, banking, green energy, chemicals, software, and healthcare. 
Table 1 below reports descriptive statistics on all SPACs which have carried out a business 
combination. Information on the two sub-samples – Good and Bad SPACs – is available as 
well. 
On average Good SPACs are smaller than Bad SPACs (€99m vs €201m) and take longer to find 
a suitable target (472 days vs 318 days from the IPO to the announcement date). The share price 
on the day before decision date is – by construction – above 100% of the listing price for Good 
SPACs, while the opposite is valid for Bad SPACs (113,7% vs 94,2%). The share price at the 
announcement date is higher on average for Good SPACs, as a potential indicator that the 
market was already positively assessing the deals at that time (101.2% vs 99.3%). 
Comparing these statistics to all SPACs that completed an acquisition in the US sample - in 
Jenkinson and Sousa study - I find that on average Italian SPACs raised more funds (€145m vs 
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€85m), have higher maximum and minimum size (€600m vs €241m as maximum and €30m vs 
€11m as minimum). In terms of days between IPO and announcement date results are very 
similar, both for averages and maximum/minimum figures. In terms of share price before 
decision date divided by listing price, averages are very similar (105% vs 107.3%), but within 
the US sample the maximum reaches 224.3% of the trust value (similar concepts to the listing 
price in my study), while in the Italian sample this value reaches just 133.2%.  
Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics 
All SPACs with business combination (18)         
 Average Maximum Minimum Median 
SPAC size (€m raised) 145 600 30 99 
Nº of days between IPO and announcement date 400 619 91 408 
Nº of days between announcement date and decision 
date 136 326 27 137 
Share price at announcement date / listing price 101,2% 136,1% 94,5% 98,6% 
Share price at day before decision date / listing price 105,0% 133,2% 72,9% 101,7% 
     
Good SPACs (10)         
 Average Maximum Minimum Median 
SPAC size (€m raised) 99 250 30 90 
Nº of days between IPO and announcement date 472 619 298 483 
Nº of days between announcement date and decision 
date 126 172 33 137 
Share price at announcement date / listing price 102,8% 136,1% 95,6% 98,6% 
Share price at day before decision date / listing price 113,7% 133,2% 101,4% 109,4% 
          
Bad SPACs (8)     
 
Average Maximum Minimum Median 
SPAC size (€m raised) 201 600 35 114 
Nº of days between IPO and announcement date 318 564 91 286 
Nº of days between announcement date and decision 
date 148 326 27 145 
Share price at announcement date / listing price 99,3% 105,0% 94,5% 99,2% 
Share price at day before decision date / listing price 94,2% 99,6% 72,9% 96,4% 
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4.2   Price behaviour at key dates  
In Figure 4 below I show the price behaviour, rebased to 100 at 3 days prior to the 
announcement date, of the two sub-samples, around two key events in the lifecycle of SPACs: 
the announcement date and the voting date. I report the data of 60 calendar days after the 
announcement of the business combination and 60 calendar days before and after the date of 
the general assembly when the acquisition will be approved or rejected by shareholders. 
From the chart in Figure 4 it is evident that the price of the two sub-samples starts to diverge 
when the announcement of a possible target is published as the market starts to assess and reflect 
into prices the quality of the deal found. Good SPACs on average show an increase in prices, 
while Bad SPACs seem just slightly negatively affected, as the investors still have the 
possibility to vote against the acquisition and receive their investment back. 
Looking at the chart in Figure 5 showing the price evolution before and after the voting date 
we can still see the difference in behaviour of the two sub-samples: Good SPACs show more 
volatility before the voting date and stabilise after that, while Bad SPACs are more stable before 
the voting date and the price deteriorates further after the voting date. 
Before the announcement date the average price stays flat, for Bad and Good SPACs, mirroring 
the liquidation value of the vehicles, equal to the money held in the escrow account. 
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Figure 4: Average price 60 days after announcement date. Rebased at 3 days before the 
announcement date and divided into the two sub-samples 
 
Figure 5: Average price 60 days before and after the voting date. Rebased at 3 days before 
the announcement date and divided into the two sub-samples 
 
4.3   Returns analysis 
The total sample of listed SPACs in the Italian market amounts to 25 companies, of which 10 
classified as Good SPACs, 8 as Bad SPACs. 7 SPACs are excluded from the categorisation as 
they were liquidated after a negative vote on a proposed business combination or after failing 
to find a suitable target within the time foreseen by their bylaws. Table 2 below reports the 
summary of my analysis in terms of returns for Good and Bad SPACs. Four methods are used: 
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Cap as market index; iii) cumulative abnormal returns with industry Beta with a broad market 
index, iv) cumulative abnormal returns with Beta equal to one. 
Table 2: Post-Acquisition Returns (standard error in parenthesis) 
Panel A. Cumulative Returns 
 Good SPACs   Bad SPACs   
Difference between 





N Average     N Average     Average     
7 10 12,3% (0,0351) *** 8 -7,34% (0,0290) ** 19,61% (0,0455) *** 
14 10 10,4% (0,0333) ** 8 -9,04% (0,0263) ** 19,48% (0,0424) *** 
28 10 10,9% (0,0416) ** 8 -7,07% (0,0244) ** 17,99% (0,0483) *** 
84 10 9,4% (0,0503) * 8 -12,78% (0,0554) * 22,21% (0,0748) *** 
182 10 11,2% (0,0462) ** 8 -19,44% (0,0652) ** 30,60% (0,0799) *** 
364 10 6,4% (0,0482)  7 -22,36% (0,0991) * 28,77% (0,1102) ** 
728 7 18,5% (0,1323)  5 -39,96% (0,1127) ** 58,46% (0,1738) ** 
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Industry beta) - Small Cap Index 
 Good SPACs   Bad SPACs   
Difference between 





N Average     N Average     Average     
7 10 0,35% (0,0281)  8 -0,88% (0,0146)  1,23% (0,0317)  
14 10 2,09% (0,0380)  8 -2,47% (0,0202)  4,56% (0,0430)  
28 10 -0,09% (0,0386)  8 -1,32% (0,0394)  1,23% (0,0552)  
84 10 0,21% (0,0379)  8 -5,42% (0,0333)  5,63% (0,0505)  
182 10 -1,93% (0,0484)  8 -8,36% (0,0770)  6,43% (0,0910)  
364 10 0,42% (0,0538)  7 -17,22% (0,1055)  17,65% (0,1185)  
728 7 1,75% (0,0803)  5 -33,56% (0,0727) *** 35,31% (0,1084) ** 
Panel C. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Industry beta) - Broad Market Index 
 Good SPACs   Bad SPACs   
Difference between 





N Average     N Average     Average     
7 10 -0,71% (0,0299)  8 -0,51% (0,0194)  -0,19% (0,036)  
14 10 0,69% (0,0405)  8 -1,97% (0,0231)  2,66% (0,047)  
28 10 -0,89% (0,0392)  8 -1,20% (0,0396)  0,30% (0,056)  
84 10 -1,70% (0,0378)  8 -9,12% (0,0523)  7,42% (0,065)  
182 10 -5,95% (0,0352)  8 -15,18% (0,0731) * 9,23% (0,081)  
364 10 -11,44% (0,0378) ** 7 -23,69% (0,1236)  12,26% (0,129)  
728 7 -18,75% (0,1126)   5 -61,53% (0,0906) *** 42,77% (0,145) ** 
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Panel D. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Beta=1) - Small Cap Index 
 Good SPACs  Bad SPACs  
Difference between Good 




N Average     N Average     Average     
7 10 0,22% (0,0281)  8 -0,77% (0,0147)  0,99% (0,032)  
14 10 2,26% (0,0377)  8 -2,43% (0,0192)  4,69% (0,042)  
28 10 0,07% (0,0384)  8 -1,28% (0,0381)  1,35% (0,054)  
84 10 -0,33% (0,0370)  8 -5,48% (0,0376)  5,14% (0,053)  
182 10 -2,04% (0,0431)  8 -9,50% (0,0745)  7,46% (0,086)  
364 10 -0,69% (0,0545)  7 -18,29% (0,1024)  17,60% (0,116)  
728 7 1,82% (0,0786)   5 -36,18% (0,0769) *** 38,00% (0,110) ** 
***Significant at the 0.01 level.                            
**Significant at the 0.05 level.                   
*Significant at the 0.10 level.                            
 
4.3.1   Raw returns  
In the chart in Figure 6 below, the performance of all SPACs that completed an acquisition (18) 
is reported for 52 weeks following the voting date. Returns are computed weekly and are 
equally weighted.  Returns are not adjusted for market movements. 
On average returns are close to 0 for the first 6 weeks after the acquisition, then they further 
decrease reaching -9.10%, 52 weeks after the voting date. Compared to the findings of 
Jenkinson and Sousa focused on the US market, returns are still negative, but not as low as the 
US counterparties. 
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In Panel A of Table 2 raw returns at 7, 14, 28, 84, 182, 364 and 728 calendar days after the 
acquisition are reported. 
The performance within the two samples is quite heterogeneous, but it is evident that the Good 
SPACs sub-sample shows on average positive raw returns from the voting day. These returns 
show little variability for a year after the voting date, as a sign that the market was adequately 
pricing the target companies. After one year from the voting date on average Good SPACs have 
a return of 6.4%, with a minimum of -12.7% and a maximum of 40%. Returns are statistically 
significant for all, but the last two periods considered (1 year and 2 years). 
On the other hand, the Bad SPACs sub-sample has disastrous returns that, on average, continue 
to worsen as time passes, with an average of -22.4%, a minimum of -66.8% and a maximum of 
6.4% after one year. Returns are statistically different from zero for all periods considered. 
The difference between the returns of the two sub-samples yields a positive return, ranging 
from a minimum of 17.99% after 28 days, to a maximum 58.46% after 2 years from the 
acquisition. The differences in returns are statistically significant for all periods considered. 
4.3.2   Cumulative abnormal returns  
Analysing risk-adjusted returns with a standard CAPM model using each individual stock’s 
beta, calculated using weekly data from the date of acquisition to 30.10.2020, is of little help in 
this case. I obtain very different and often unrealistic betas for single stocks – some of which 
are not statistically significant – and with very low R2 adjusted values. These results might 
indicate that using a standard CAPM model to estimate beta for single stocks, often illiquid, 
with short time series is not a feasible solution.   
To overcome the limits of the Beta estimation, outline above, I use as proxy for each SPAC the 
industry Beta, obtained from Damodaran website. I select FTSE Italia Small Cap as market 
index. Using this methodology, with results presented in Table 2 Panel B, the abnormal returns 
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for Good SPACs are very close to 0% for all periods considered and are not statistically 
significant. Bad SPACs show negative abnormal returns, but statistically significant just after 
728 days from the acquisition, with a return of -33.56%. The difference between Good and Bad 
SPACs is positive, but less striking than the one obtained considering solely raw returns. The 
difference is statistically significant at 728 days after acquisition, with a difference between the 
return of Good SPACs and Bad SPACS of 35.31%. 
In Panel C, the methodology applied is the same as the one used in Panel B. The only change 
lies in the selection of the market index, I use a broader one – S&P 500 – to better match the 
source of the industry betas considered. The abnormal returns worsen considerably for both 
sub-samples. The Good SPACs sample after 6 months yields -5.95%, after 1 year (only period 
statistically significative) yields -11.44% and after 2 years -18.75%. The Bad SPACs sub-
sample shows staggering results, reaching -15.18% after 6 months, -23.69% after 1 year and -
61.53% after two year. Results are statistically significant after 6 months and 2 years, while 
they are not for the other periods. The difference between the two reaches 42.77% after 2 years 
and it is the only period for which results are statistically significant. 
The results of Panel D are very similar to the ones in Panel B, where I use a Beta equal to one, 
to adjust for the market performance, instead of the industry Beta. The only statistically 
significant difference between Good and Bad SPACs is, again, at 728 days after the acquisition, 
with a difference in returns of 38%. 
4.3.3   Why are Bad SPACs not liquidated? 
According to the findings I presented in the previous paragraphs, some acquisitions were carried 
out notwithstanding that the market was signalling, before the voting date, that those mergers 
were value-destroying. 
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I try to explain this puzzling result by analysing the trading volumes around the vote day in the 
two sub-samples, as Jenkinson and Sousa found evidence for increased purchases – likely by 
the founders – of shares for the Bad SPACs, in an attempt of increasing the votes in favour of 
the acquisition. I found no evidence of this behaviour – although the volumes traded are very 
small – but rather the opposite; the Good SPACs volumes showed more activity in the 60 days 
after the announcement and in the 60 days before the voting date, as reported in the charts 
below. 
Figure 7: Daily volumes / total outstanding shares 60 days after and before announcement date 
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In addition to the approach of Jenkinson and Sousa, I analysed the evolution of the cumulative 
volumes since listing in the two sub-samples in the same time horizon as the previous analysis. 
I find some evidence of more shares as a percentage of the outstanding ones being traded since 
the inception in the Bad SPACs sample, that could indicate that the parties gaining substantially 
from the acquisition to be completed – namely founders, target shareholders and in some cases 
underwriters – might have built up a substantial stake in order to influence the voting outcome. 
The charts are reported below:  
Figure 9: Cumulated volumes / total outstanding shares -  60 days after and before 
announcement date 
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These results are solely based on public data available, and without knowing more information 
on the shareholders’ structure and how the different groups casted their votes at the general 
assembly is difficult to draw conclusions on that. 
5. Conclusion and limitations 
A small number of caveats apply to my study: i) The sample analysed is small and often with 
short time series; ii) SPAC classification is not a standardised categorisation and a sizeable 
amount of manual search is needed, making the study of this market not easily scalable; iii) 
After the merger of the SPAC with the target, stocks are listed in the market with a new ticker 
and often the investor relations information is no longer available; iv) Regulatory filings 
potentially useful in understanding the trades and behaviour of insider have not been analysed; 
v) Market data on warrants and on single trades around the date of announcement are limited 
in time. 
Overall, this asset class is appealing to several stakeholders, sponsors can leverage on their 
industry expertise, targets are listed without the drawbacks of traditional IPOs, targets’ existing 
shareholders are able to quickly cash in their stake and investors are able to access investments 
opportunities with limited downside. These reasons potentially explain why SPACs are still 
alive and thriving. 
In a world of abundant liquidity with desperate search for yield SPACs, if carefully selected, 
might provide a good source of returns. In an economy, such as the Italian one, with funding 
mostly bank-based and with a lower number of companies listed on the stock exchange 
compared to European peers, SPACs might be a good instrument for achieving good returns, 
increasing market discipline, and benefiting the economy as a whole. 
Regarding future prosperity as an asset class, I believe this will depend on finding an 
equilibrium in terms of an institutional framework for the instrument where the incentives for 
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the stakeholders involved are adequately calibrated and thereby the likelihood of opportunistic 
behaviour is reduced.  
Overall time will tell the success of this product, but more research and scrutiny are needed to 
increase awareness of investors’ choices. 
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7. Appendix  





IPO Size €m Listing date
Announcement 
combination date
Date voting on 
combination
Price @ 
announcement + 1 
Price @ vote -
1 
Price @ vote 7 14 28 84 182 364 728 1092
Banks (Regional) 0,4969 SPAX IM Equity ILTY IM Equity 600 12/01/2018 13/04/2018 05/03/2019 9,61 7,29 7,30 -24,6% -21,7% -11,9% -17,3% -19,0% -7,7% NA NA
Packaging & Container 1,1125 GCL IM Equity 500 27/11/2017 16/04/2018 06/08/2018 10,00 9,84 9,72 -3,0% -3,2% -6,0% -23,0% -40,2% -38,2% -35,9% NA
NA NA IDM IM Equity 250 22/11/2017 29/10/2018 NA 9,72 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Aerospace/Defense 1,3043 AVIO IM Equity 250 15/07/2015 20/10/2016 10/04/2017 10,20 13,32 13,40 32,3% 31,0% 36,5% 31,1% 37,5% 40,0% 24,8% 21,2%
Apparel 1,0385 FILA IM Equity 130 03/12/2013 15/01/2015 01/06/2015 9,56 11,87 9,38 -2,9% -5,4% -4,9% -10,5% 3,4% 21,3% 75,9% 67,1%
Machinery 1,3113 IN3 IM Equity SCF IM Equity 150 28/09/2017 15/04/2019 08/11/2019 9,85 9,90 9,65 -6,7% -5,0% 3,9% 12,0% 6,5% NA NA NA
NA NA 1819370D IM Equity 150 14/07/2017 19/01/2018 NA 10,30 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA LCC IM Equity 140 12/02/2018 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Chemical (Specialty) 1,2151 SICT IM Equity 150 05/07/2017 11/01/2019 04/06/2019 13,61 10,14 10,15 4,5% 1,7% 0,8% -11,0% 1,0% 1,0% NA NA
Electrical Equipment 1,3364 CELL IM Equity 130 24/02/2017 18/01/2018 04/06/2018 10,50 9,45 9,40 -6,5% -8,0% -12,0% -16,0% -15,0% -30,0% -50,2% NA
NA NA VALU IM Equity 110 04/04/2018 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA VEI1 IM Equity 100 31/01/2018 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Software (System & Application) 1,1485 ALPI IM Equity AV IM Equity 100 19/01/2018 19/12/2018 18/04/2019 9,80 10,80 11,99 25,2% 17,5% 14,0% 6,8% -1,0% -2,4% NA NA
Drugs (Pharmaceutical) 1,1493 FF IM Equity 100 26/09/2016 07/06/2018 10/07/2018 9,80 10,20 10,30 4,0% 3,0% 4,0% -2,0% -4,5% 1,0% 6,0% NA
Machinery 1,3113 CFT IM Equity 98 28/06/2017 27/02/2018 30/07/2018 10,30 9,68 9,24 -13,2% -18,0% -17,8% -34,2% -45,2% -66,8% -77,7% NA
NA NA SPTV IM Equity 90 13/09/2017 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Food Wholesalers 0,7786 ORS IM Equity 80 16/06/2015 28/10/2016 13/02/2017 9,86 11,09 10,59 5,5% 6,5% 2,6% 30,6% 29,1% -12,7% -25,1% -32,0%
NA NA CFP IM Equity 65 11/07/2017 19/06/2018 NA 9,70 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Software (System & Application) 1,1485 SES IM Equity 50 20/06/2011 15/10/2012 01/02/2013 10,00 10,80 10,75 6,5% 5,5% 2,4% 4,5% 5,5% 13,8% 32,8% 44,2%
Machinery 1,3113 ISI IM Equity LUVE IM Equity 50 18/06/2013 26/01/2015 09/07/2015 9,90 11,79 11,21 10,8% 9,7% 10,0% 1,2% 0,0% -6,5% 35,1% 0,0%
Electronics (General) 1,2907 IN2 IM Equity SIT IM Equity 51 03/05/2016 25/02/2017 20/07/2017 9,81 13,30 10,92 14,9% 15,9% 14,4% 19,4% 17,0% 7,0% -20,0% -53,1%
Insurance (General) 0,9065 ARCH IM Equity NET IM Equity 47 16/04/2018 20/11/2018 17/12/2018 9,45 9,60 9,59 -3,0% -10,5% -6,7% 1,2% -20,7% 5,7% NA NA
Heathcare Information and Technology 1,1224 1726931D IM Equity GPI IM Equity 51 27/07/2015 05/09/2016 19/10/2016 9,98 9,96 9,96 2,0% 0,0% -0,1% 0,0% 4,0% 6,4% -14,2% -25,0%
Green & Renewable Energy 0,9223 ESCO IM Equity 35 18/12/2013 25/06/2015 22/12/2015 9,77 9,60 9,50 -3,7% -5,9% -6,0% -25,0% -25,9% -26,0% -21,8% NA
Machinery 1,3113 GEA IM Equity COM IM Equity 30 22/01/2019 NA 13/03/2019 NA 10,40 11,70 21,9% 19,0% 29,4% 24,2% 23,6% 1,6% NA NA
Average 140 100,9% 105,0% 102,6% 0,4% 0,2% 0,3% 0,0% -0,2% -0,5% -0,6% 0,3%
Max 600 136,1% 133,2% 134,0% 3,2% 3,1% 3,7% 3,1% 3,8% 4,0% 7,6% 6,7%
Min 30 94,5% 72,9% 73,0% -2,5% -2,2% -1,8% -3,4% -4,5% -6,7% -7,8% -5,3%
Median 100 98,5% 101,7% 100,6% 0,3% 0,1% 0,2% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% -1,7% 0,0%
Cumulative Returns after t days
All SPACs







IPO Size €m Listing date
Announcement 
combination date
Date voting on 
combination
Price @ 
announcement + 1 
Price @ vote -
1 
Price @ vote 7 14 28 84 182 364 728 1092
Banks (Regional) 0,4969 SPAX IM Equity ILTY IM Equity 600 12/01/2018 13/04/2018 05/03/2019 9,61 7,29 7,30 -24,6% -21,7% -11,9% -17,3% -19,0% -7,7% NA NA
Packaging & Container 1,1125 GCL IM Equity 500 27/11/2017 16/04/2018 06/08/2018 10,00 9,84 9,72 -3,0% -3,2% -6,0% -23,0% -40,2% -38,2% -35,9% NA
Aerospace/Defense 1,3043 AVIO IM Equity 250 15/07/2015 20/10/2016 10/04/2017 10,20 13,32 13,40 32,3% 31,0% 36,5% 31,1% 37,5% 40,0% 24,8% 21,2%
Apparel 1,0385 FILA IM Equity 130 03/12/2013 15/01/2015 01/06/2015 9,56 11,87 9,38 -2,9% -5,4% -4,9% -10,5% 3,4% 21,3% 75,9% 67,1%
Machinery 1,3113 IN3 IM Equity SCF IM Equity 150 28/09/2017 15/04/2019 08/11/2019 9,85 9,90 9,65 -6,7% -5,0% 3,9% 12,0% 6,5% NA NA NA
Chemical (Specialty) 1,2151 SICT IM Equity 150 05/07/2017 11/01/2019 04/06/2019 13,61 10,14 10,15 4,5% 1,7% 0,8% -11,0% 1,0% 1,0% NA NA
Electrical Equipment 1,3364 CELL IM Equity 130 24/02/2017 18/01/2018 04/06/2018 10,50 9,45 9,40 -6,5% -8,0% -12,0% -16,0% -15,0% -30,0% -50,2% NA
Software (System & Application) 1,1485 ALPI IM Equity AV IM Equity 100 19/01/2018 19/12/2018 18/04/2019 9,80 10,80 11,99 25,2% 17,5% 14,0% 6,8% -1,0% -2,4% NA NA
Drugs (Pharmaceutical) 1,1493 FF IM Equity 100 26/09/2016 07/06/2018 10/07/2018 9,80 10,20 10,30 4,0% 3,0% 4,0% -2,0% -4,5% 1,0% 6,0% NA
Machinery 1,3113 CFT IM Equity 98 28/06/2017 27/02/2018 30/07/2018 10,30 9,68 9,24 -13,2% -18,0% -17,8% -34,2% -45,2% -66,8% -77,7% NA
Food Wholesalers 0,7786 ORS IM Equity 80 16/06/2015 28/10/2016 13/02/2017 9,86 11,09 10,59 5,5% 6,5% 2,6% 30,6% 29,1% -12,7% -25,1% -32,0%
Software (System & Application) 1,1485 SES IM Equity 50 20/06/2011 15/10/2012 01/02/2013 10,00 10,80 10,75 6,5% 5,5% 2,4% 4,5% 5,5% 13,8% 32,8% 44,2%
Machinery 1,3113 ISI IM Equity LUVE IM Equity 50 18/06/2013 26/01/2015 09/07/2015 9,90 11,79 11,21 10,8% 9,7% 10,0% 1,2% 0,0% -6,5% 35,1% 0,0%
Electronics (General) 1,2907 IN2 IM Equity SIT IM Equity 51 03/05/2016 25/02/2017 20/07/2017 9,81 13,30 10,92 14,9% 15,9% 14,4% 19,4% 17,0% 7,0% -20,0% -53,1%
Insurance (General) 0,9065 ARCH IM Equity NET IM Equity 47 16/04/2018 20/11/2018 17/12/2018 9,45 9,60 9,59 -3,0% -10,5% -6,7% 1,2% -20,7% 5,7% NA NA
Heathcare Information and Technology 1,1224 1726931D IM Equity GPI IM Equity 51 27/07/2015 05/09/2016 19/10/2016 9,98 9,96 9,96 2,0% 0,0% -0,1% 0,0% 4,0% 6,4% -14,2% -25,0%
Green & Renewable Energy 0,9223 ESCO IM Equity 35 18/12/2013 25/06/2015 22/12/2015 9,77 9,60 9,50 -3,7% -5,9% -6,0% -25,0% -25,9% -26,0% -21,8% NA
Machinery 1,3113 GEA IM Equity COM IM Equity 30 22/01/2019 NA 13/03/2019 NA 10,40 11,70 21,9% 19,0% 29,4% 24,2% 23,6% 1,6% NA NA
Average 145 101,2% 105,0% 102,6% 3,6% 1,8% 2,9% -0,4% -2,4% -5,4% -5,9% 3,2%
Max 600 136,1% 133,2% 134,0% 32,3% 31,0% 36,5% 31,1% 37,5% 40,0% 75,9% 67,1%
Min 30 94,5% 72,9% 73,0% -24,6% -21,7% -17,8% -34,2% -45,2% -66,8% -77,7% -53,1%
Median 99 98,6% 101,7% 100,6% 3,0% 0,8% 1,6% 0,6% 0,5% 1,0% -17,1% 0,0%
Cumulative Returns after t days
All SPACs with business combination










IPO Size €m Listing date
Announcement 
combination date
Date voting on 
combination
Price @ 
announcement + 1 
Price @ vote -
1 
Price @ vote 7 14 28 84 182 364 728 1092
Aerospace/Defense 1,3043 AVIO IM Equity 250 15/07/2015 20/10/2016 10/04/2017 10,20 13,32 13,40 32,3% 31,0% 36,5% 31,1% 37,5% 40,0% 24,8% 21,2%
Apparel 1,0385 FILA IM Equity 130 03/12/2013 15/01/2015 01/06/2015 9,56 11,87 9,38 -2,9% -5,4% -4,9% -10,5% 3,4% 21,3% 75,9% 67,1%
Chemical (Specialty) 1,2151 SICT IM Equity 150 05/07/2017 11/01/2019 04/06/2019 13,61 10,14 10,15 4,5% 1,7% 0,8% -11,0% 1,0% 1,0% NA NA
Software (System & Application) 1,1485 ALPI IM Equity AV IM Equity 100 19/01/2018 19/12/2018 18/04/2019 9,80 10,80 11,99 25,2% 17,5% 14,0% 6,8% -1,0% -2,4% NA NA
Drugs (Pharmaceutical) 1,1493 FF IM Equity 100 26/09/2016 07/06/2018 10/07/2018 9,80 10,20 10,30 4,0% 3,0% 4,0% -2,0% -4,5% 1,0% 6,0% NA
Food Wholesalers 0,7786 ORS IM Equity 80 16/06/2015 28/10/2016 13/02/2017 9,86 11,09 10,59 5,5% 6,5% 2,6% 30,6% 29,1% -12,7% -25,1% -32,0%
Software (System & Application) 1,1485 SES IM Equity 50 20/06/2011 15/10/2012 01/02/2013 10,00 10,80 10,75 6,5% 5,5% 2,4% 4,5% 5,5% 13,8% 32,8% 44,2%
Machinery 1,3113 ISI IM Equity LUVE IM Equity 50 18/06/2013 26/01/2015 09/07/2015 9,90 11,79 11,21 10,8% 9,7% 10,0% 1,2% 0,0% -6,5% 35,1% 0,0%
Electronics (General) 1,2907 IN2 IM Equity SIT IM Equity 51 03/05/2016 25/02/2017 20/07/2017 9,81 13,3 10,92 14,9% 15,9% 14,4% 19,4% 17,0% 7,0% -20,0% -53,1%
Machinery 1,3113 GEA IM Equity COM IM Equity 30 22/01/2019 NA 13/03/2019 NA 10,40 11,70 21,9% 19,0% 29,4% 24,2% 23,6% 1,6% NA NA
Average 99 102,8% 113,7% 110,4% 12,3% 10,4% 10,9% 9,4% 11,2% 6,4% 18,5% 7,9%
Max 250 136,1% 133,2% 134,0% 32,3% 31,0% 36,5% 31,1% 37,5% 40,0% 75,9% 67,1%
Min 30 95,6% 101,4% 93,8% -2,9% -5,4% -4,9% -11,0% -4,5% -12,7% -25,1% -53,1%
Median 90 98,6% 109,4% 108,4% 8,7% 8,1% 7,0% 5,7% 4,4% 1,3% 24,8% 10,6%





IPO Size €m Listing date
Announcement 
combination date
Date voting on 
combination
Price @ 
announcement + 1 
Price @ vote -
1 
Price @ vote 7 14 28 84 182 364 728 1092
Banks (Regional) 0,4969 SPAX IM Equity ILTY IM Equity 600 12/01/2018 13/04/2018 05/03/2019 9,61 7,29 7,30 -24,6% -21,7% -11,9% -17,3% -19,0% -7,7% NA NA
Packaging & Container 1,1125 GCL IM Equity 500 27/11/2017 16/04/2018 06/08/2018 10,00 9,84 9,72 -3,0% -3,2% -6,0% -23,0% -40,2% -38,2% -35,9% NA
Machinery 1,3113 IN3 IM Equity SCF IM Equity 150 28/09/2017 15/04/2019 08/11/2019 9,85 9,90 9,65 -6,7% -5,0% 3,9% 12,0% 6,5% NA NA NA
Electrical Equipment 1,3364 CELL IM Equity 130 24/02/2017 18/01/2018 04/06/2018 10,50 9,45 9,40 -6,5% -8,0% -12,0% -16,0% -15,0% -30,0% -50,2% NA
Machinery 1,3113 CFT IM Equity 98 28/06/2017 27/02/2018 30/07/2018 10,30 9,68 9,24 -13,2% -18,0% -17,8% -34,2% -45,2% -66,8% -77,7% NA
Insurance (General) 0,9065 ARCH IM Equity NET IM Equity 47 16/04/2018 20/11/2018 17/12/2018 9,45 9,60 9,59 -3,0% -10,5% -6,7% 1,2% -20,7% 5,7% NA NA
Heathcare Information and Technology 1,1224 1726931D IM Equity GPI IM Equity 51 27/07/2015 05/09/2016 19/10/2016 9,98 9,96 9,96 2,0% 0,0% -0,1% 0,0% 4,0% 6,4% -14,2% -25,0%
Green & Renewable Energy 0,9223 ESCO IM Equity 35 18/12/2013 25/06/2015 22/12/2015 9,77 9,60 9,50 -3,7% -5,9% -6,0% -25,0% -25,9% -26,0% -21,8% NA
Average 201 99,3% 94,2% 92,9% -7,3% -9,0% -7,1% -12,8% -19,4% -22,4% -40,0% -25,0%
Max 600 105,0% 99,6% 99,6% 2,0% 0,0% 3,9% 12,0% 6,5% 6,4% -14,2% -25,0%
Min 35 94,5% 72,9% 73,0% -24,6% -21,7% -17,8% -34,2% -45,2% -66,8% -77,7% -25,0%
Median 114 99,2% 96,4% 95,5% -5,1% -6,9% -6,3% -16,7% -19,9% -26,0% -35,9% -25,0%
Cumulative Returns after t days
Bad SPACs
